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The Lemon test, as it is known, represented the 
Court’s attempt to accommodate competing if not 
contradictory goals of the Establishment Clause: On the 
one hand, the Clause “severs the link between Church 
and State”; on the other hand, it “does not disassociate 
religion from government.”8 The Lemon test has been 
widely criticized by commentators and at least seven 
Supreme Court justices,9 and it has been signifi cantly 
watered down in more recent cases.10 Nevertheless, it 
never has been offi cially repudiated by the Court and is 
frequently applied by the Court in Establishment Clause 
cases.11 
Despite the fact that Lemon was the Court’s leading 
Establishment Clause case, the Court declined to apply 
the Lemon test twelve years later in Marsh v. Chambers.12 
Instead, the Court invoked the early history of the Re-
public in rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge in 
a case involving legislative prayer. 
The facts in Marsh were as follows: The Nebraska 
Legislature13 began each session with a prayer offered 
by a chaplain who was chosen every two years by the 
Legislative Council and paid with public funds. Er-
nest Chambers, a state legislator who thought that this 
violated the Establishment Clause, sued to enjoin the 
practice. The defendants included State Treasurer Frank 
Marsh and Robert Palmer, a Presbyterian minister who 
had held the chaplaincy position for sixteen years.
The federal district court applied the Lemon test 
separately to the challenged practices of prayer and 
funding for the chaplain. It upheld the constitutional-
ity of offering daily prayers but concluded that use of 
state funds to pay Reverend Palmer’s salary of $320 
per month and to publish books of his prayers was 
unconstitutional.14
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit held that actions of the Nebraska 
Legislature had to be viewed as a whole because
“[t]he funding is inextricably bound up with the prayers 
themselves.”15 It concluded that the chaplaincy practice 
violated all three elements of the Lemon test and en-
joined the entire practice.16 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and then 
reversed the Eighth Circuit in an Opinion by Chief 
Justice Warren Burger. The Court upheld the Nebraska 
chaplaincy practice in its entirety.17 The lynchpin of the 
Court’s decision was that the First Congress both rati-
fi ed the Bill of Rights, including the First Amendment, 
and enacted a statute to pay chaplains. Indeed, a fi nal 
agreement was reached on the language of the Bill of 
Rights on September 25, 1789, only three days after Con-
The Supreme Court may 
be about to make a major 
decision involving the First 
Amendment Establishment 
Clause1 and local govern-
ments in this year’s United 
States Supreme Court Term. 
On May 20, 2013, the Court 
granted the petition for 
certiorari of the Town of 
Greece, New York in a case 
challenging offi cial prayers 
at town council meetings.2 It 
is hard to imagine a greater facial violation of “the wall 
of separation between church and state”3 than prayer at 
a session of an American law-making body.4 Neverthe-
less, the constitutionality of legislative prayer has been 
generally upheld since the Supreme Court decided 
Marsh v. Chambers in 1983.5 
This article will discuss Galloway v. Town of Greece, 
the case currently pending at the Supreme Court. It will 
begin with a brief discussion of Lemon v. Kurtzman6 and 
Marsh to provide the background necessary for under-
standing the issues raised by Galloway. The article then 
will examine the district and circuit court decisions in 
Galloway and the Establishment Clause issues posed by 
the case. Next, it will note issues raised by other lower 
court decisions involving legislative prayer after Marsh. 
Moving from description of the rather muddled 
state of precedent in this area to the Supreme Court’s 
duty, in deciding Galloway, to clarify and decide the 
constitutional issues, the article will recommend that 
the Court not only affi rm the Second Circuit’s decision 
in Galloway but also either overturn or sharply limit 
the Marsh precedent. As this recommendation seems 
unlikely to be followed, the article ends with a plea that 
the Court decide Galloway in a way that provides lower 
courts with greater guidance when addressing the 
wide variety of fact patterns and legal issues raised by 
municipal prayer cases after Marsh.
Background: The Lemon Test and the Marsh 
Case
In 1971, the Supreme Court announced in Lemon 
v. Kurtzman what became the leading test for evaluat-
ing the constitutionality of a law or practice under the 
Establishment Clause:  “First, the statute must have 
a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or 
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion; fi nally, the statute must not foster ‘an 
excessive government entanglement with religion.’”7 
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neither of whom is a Christian, complained without 
success to the town about its prayer practice.29 On 
February 28, 2008, Galloway and Stephens, arguing that 
the town’s prayer practices violated the Establishment 
Clause, sued the town and Supervisor John Auberger 
for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. 
Although Galloway felt that prayer was inap-
propriate at government meetings, she only asked the 
Town Board to make the prayers “nonsectarian.” Ste-
phens regarded all legislative prayer as inappropriate 
and believed that “sectarian prayers” were “more of-
fensive than nonsectarian ones.”30 Plaintiffs contended 
that Marsh and Allegheny forbade all sectarian prayer; 
however, they did not oppose “inclusive and ecumeni-
cal” prayer.31 They also claimed that the town’s proce-
dure for selecting clergy was unconstitutional because 
it favored Christians over other faiths.32
The parties conducted extensive discovery, de-
scribed in detail in the decision of United States Dis-
trict Court Judge Charles J. Siragusa. The district court 
found that Supervisor John Auberger had instituted 
the Town of Greece’s informal policy of inviting local 
clergy to offer prayers at the beginning of Town Board 
meetings in 1999 after he observed this practice at meet-
ings of the Monroe County Legislature. From that time 
through 2010, responsibility for inviting clergy to de-
liver prayers at Town Board meetings was delegated to 
employees of the Town’s Offi ce of Constituent Services. 
They consulted a “Community Guide” published by 
the Town Chamber of Commerce for a list of religious 
organizations within the town’s borders. Before each 
meeting, a clerk would make telephone calls to such 
groups until she found a clergyman willing to offer the 
prayer. In the course of time, groups who did not wish 
to participate were removed and others were added. 
Almost all places of worship in the Town of Greece 
were Christian, as were most of the prayer givers.33 
Some of the prayers were Christian in nature and con-
tained explicit references to Jesus Christ.34 The district 
court found no evidence that the town clerks who 
selected the prayer givers were biased;35 they did not 
attend the Board meetings themselves, and there was 
no indication of their religious affi liation, if any. After 
plaintiffs sued the Town, moreover, the clerk in charge 
added a “Wiccan Priestess”36 and a Jewish layman to 
the list of approved prayer givers. A representative of 
the Baha’i Assembly of Greece had also been added to 
the list and delivered an invocation at a Town Board 
meeting during this period.37 
Because there was little disagreement between the 
parties on the underlying facts, Judge Siragusa decided 
that a trial was unnecessary and the parties submitted 
cross-motions for summary judgment. On August 5, 
2010, he granted the Town’s motion and entered judg-
ment in its favor and against the plaintiffs. 
gress passed the statute.18 The Court concluded that 
those who drafted the First Amendment could not have 
believed that paid chaplains violated the Establishment 
Clause.
The Court declared that “the practice of opening 
legislative sessions with prayer has become part of 
the fabric of our society” and the practice of invoking 
divine guidance on lawmakers “is simply a tolerable 
acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the 
people of this country.”19 Nor was paying the chaplain 
of a particular denomination with public funds a viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause, the Court explained, 
because the fi rst Continental Congress had also com-
pensated its chaplain.20 Furthermore, the Court held 
that “absent proof that the chaplain’s reappointment 
stemmed from an impermissible motive… his long 
tenure does not in itself confl ict with the Establishment 
Clause.”21
In addition, the Court suggested that it was not 
incumbent on courts to scrutinize legislative prayers in 
order to eliminate sectarian messages. It stated: “The 
content of the prayer is not of concern to judges where, 
as here, there is no indication that the prayer opportu-
nity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any 
one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief. That be-
ing so, it is not for us to embark on a sensitive evalua-
tion or to parse the content of a particular prayer.”22
The only elaborations by the Supreme Court of its 
holding in Marsh were provided in two subsequent cas-
es: County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union23 
and Lee v. Weisman.24 The Allegheny Court emphasized 
that even the Marsh Court had recognized that not all 
practices that were 200 years old were necessarily au-
tomatically constitutional and that legislative prayers 
that affi liate the government with any one specifi c faith 
or belief were unconstitutional. It further stated: “The 
legislative prayers involved in Marsh did not violate 
this principle because the particular chaplain had ‘re-
moved all references to Christ.’”25
Public school commencements are functions of 
state government and thus are subject to Establishment 
Clause strictures. As in Marsh, the challenged event in 
Lee v. Weisman was a prayer preceding the program.26 
Because the Court in Lee squarely distinguished the 
Marsh precedent,27 however, it has scant relevance to 
legislative prayer.
Galloway in the District Court
Greece is a town of about 94,000 residents, located 
just outside Rochester. Since 1999, the Greece Town 
Council had arranged for religious invocations to be 
delivered by clergy and other individuals at the begin-
ning of its monthly meetings. Christian clergymen de-
livered the vast majority of the prayers.28 Beginning in 
September 2007, Susan Galloway and Linda Stephens, 
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After discussing the applicable law, the Second Cir-
cuit noted that there was no precise criterion or formula 
for determining whether there was an Establishment 
Clause violation in connection with legislative prayer. 
Instead, as Judge Calabresi wrote, “we see ‘no test-
related substitute for the exercise of legal judgment.’”48 
After reviewing the entire record, the court concluded 
that the town’s prayer practice had to be viewed as an 
endorsement of the Christian faith. 
The Court found a number of facts that supported 
this conclusion. It noted that “[i]n the town’s view, the 
preponderance of Christian clergy was the result of a 
random selection process.”49 However, the town had in-
vited clergy almost exclusively from places of worship 
within the town’s borders, which were overwhelmingly 
Christian, while some town residents might be mem-
bers of congregations outside the town or of no congre-
gation at all. In addition, the town had neither informed 
members of the public that they could volunteer to offer 
prayers, nor had it publicly solicited prayer volunteers. 
As a result, the town’s selection process could not result 
in “a perspective that is substantially neutral amongst 
creeds.”50 Instead, the process virtually ensured that a 
Christian viewpoint overwhelmingly predominated.
Furthermore, the Court noted, prayer givers often 
appeared to speak on behalf of all present and even the 
town itself. Prayer givers often asked the audience to 
participate and to signify their assent by standing or 
bowing their heads. “It is no small thing for a non-
Christian (or for a Christian, for that matter) to pray 
‘in the name of Jesus Christ,’” the Court wrote.51 This 
“placed audience members who were nonreligious or 
adherents of non-Christian religions in the awkward 
position of either participating in prayers invoking be-
liefs they did not share or appearing to show disrespect 
for the invocation[.]”52 Thus, even though the prayers 
refrained from proselytization, the unending succes-
sion of “often specifi cally sectarian Christian prayers”53 
would create the impression in an objective, reasonable 
person that “the town’s prayer practice associated the 
town with the Christian religion.”54
The Court emphasized that it was not stating that 
legislative prayers to open town meetings violated the 
Establishment Clause, even if they occasionally were 
sectarian in nature.55 The Constitution required, how-
ever, that the prayers offered “do not express an offi cial 
town religion, and do not purport to speak on behalf 
of all the town’s residents or to compel their assent to 
a particular belief.”56 In summary, “a legislative prayer 
practice that, however well-intentioned, conveys to a 
reasonable objective observer under the totality of the 
circumstances an offi cial affi liation with a particular 
religion violates the clear command of the Establish-
ment Clause.”57 
The district court concluded that the Town of 
Greece’s legislative prayer practices were consistent 
with Marsh. It found that there was no indication in the 
record that the town’s prayer policy had been estab-
lished for an improper purpose such as “to proselytize 
or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or 
belief.”38 Instead, its policy was to invite all the denom-
inations in the town and to even welcome volunteers, 
like atheists and members of non-Judeo-Christian 
religions, to give invocations.39 
The court added that “[t]he mere fact that prayers 
may contain a reference to Jesus or another deity does 
not make them proselytizing. Instead, limited referenc-
es such as, ‘in Jesus’s name,’ are, under the facts of this 
case, ‘tolerable acknowledgment[s] of beliefs widely 
held among the people of this country.’”40
The court also rejected the argument that only 
nonsectarian prayer should be tolerated.41 In support 
of this conclusion, it noted that legislative prayer in 
Congress over the years had often been “overtly sectar-
ian”42 and took “judicial notice” of two recent sectar-
ian invocations that ministers had delivered in recent 
months in the House of Representatives.43 
Finally, the district court rejected plaintiffs’ con-
tention that the town should instruct potential prayer 
givers that their prayers should be “inclusive and ecu-
menical.”44 It found that “[p]laintiffs’ proposed nonsec-
tarian policy, which would require town offi cials to dif-
ferentiate between sectarian prayers and nonsectarian 
prayers, is vague and unworkable, as Pelphrey demon-
strates.”45 Accordingly, the court found as a matter of 
law that the town had not violated the Establishment 
Clause, and it granted the town’s motion for summary 
judgment.
Galloway in the Second Circuit
In a unanimous decision, the Second Circuit 
reversed the district court’s grant of summary judg-
ment to the Town of Greece and remanded the case for 
further proceedings and appropriate relief. The author 
of the decision, Judge Guido Calabresi, initially noted 
that the scope of the issues had narrowed on appeal, as 
the plaintiffs had abandoned their argument that the 
town intentionally discriminated against non-Chris-
tians in its selection of prayer givers.46
The only remaining issue on appeal was whether 
the district court had erred in rejecting plaintiffs’ claim 
that the town’s prayer practice had the effect, even if 
not the purpose, of establishing religion in violation of 
the Establishment Clause. The Second Circuit con-
cluded that, based on the totality of the circumstances, 
the plaintiffs had demonstrated that the town’s prayer 
practice impermissibly affi liated the town with a single 
creed, Christianity.47
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disparaging other religions, there would be no constitu-
tional problem, and that other forms of sectarian prayer 
were permissible. Some courts have so held.65
Determining whether or not a prayer is “sectarian” 
is not necessarily a straightforward matter. As noted 
above, the court of appeals in Pelphrey observed that 
counsel for plaintiff in that case deemed “Heavenly Fa-
ther” and “Lord” nonsectarian, even though his clients 
testifi ed to the contrary.66 Judge Middlebrooks, dissent-
ing in Joyner, claimed that “there is no clear defi nition 
of what constitutes a ‘sectarian’ prayer.”67
The Author’s Recommendation
Thirty years of its misbegotten progeny have 
exposed the deep fl aws in Marsh, which arguably was 
wrongly decided and inarguably failed to provide 
adequate guidelines for deciding the controversies that 
were certain to arise around the vexing issue of munici-
pal legislative prayer. In deciding the constitutionality 
of a hired, paid long-term chaplain, the Court gave no 
guidance to town and city councils about how they 
could administer a program of legislative prayer by 
volunteers without violating the Establishment Clause.
By relying on Eighteenth Century history as the 
basis for its decision and simply brushing aside the 
dominant test, which it had fashioned over the years 
to govern Establishment Clause cases,68 the Supreme 
Court took the easy way out. It avoided a decision 
which would no doubt have provoked a fi restorm of 
protest69 and it emerged relatively unscathed. But the 
expediency of this approach came at the cost of en-
gendering doctrinal confusion that has plagued lower 
courts ever since. This time, at long last, the Court 
should strive for a broad, comprehensive disposition 
which seeks to resolve the many issues engendered by 
Marsh and left unresolved for so long.
As part of its task in Galloway, the Court should 
face forthrightly a regrettable consequence of apply-
ing the Marsh holding to municipal legislative prayer: 
divisiveness and confl ict among people of different 
faiths.70 Such confl ict arguably takes its greatest toll 
when waged by members of the same local community. 
The Supreme Court has highlighted divisiveness as 
part of the entanglement “prong” of the Lemon test,71 
and a noted authority asserted that “political division 
on religious lines is one of the principal evils that [the] 
First Amendment sought to forestall.”72
As Judge Calabresi noted in Galloway, “People with 
the best of intentions may be tempted, in the course of 
giving a legislative prayer, to convey their views of re-
ligious truth, and thereby run the risk of making others 
feel like outsiders.”73 
In my view, the progeny of Marsh at the municipal 
level sadly mirror what Justice Felix Frankfurter called 
The Larger Context
Galloway is one of a number of cases decided by 
lower courts involving challenges to legislative prayer 
at the municipal level. (Interestingly, the absence of 
reported cases involving challenges to chaplains in 
state legislatures suggests that most of the states have 
accepted Marsh and have not encountered diffi culty in 
applying its holding to their proceedings.)58 In fact, the 
cases involving prayers at town and city council meet-
ings reveal a distressing degree of divisiveness between 
the dominant Christian prayer givers and adherents of 
minority and non-Western religions, as well as among 
the different Christian groups.59 It is regrettable that 
prayers which no doubt are intended to bring commu-
nity members together and to unite them in the impor-
tant enterprise of self-government should engender 
such disharmony. 
This welter of cases may be due to the fact-and-
history-specifi c nature of the Court’s decision in Marsh. 
(Galloway shares this fact-specifi c approach to deciding 
the case.) In essence, federal courts called upon to adju-
dicate disputes about legislative prayer are engaged in 
building a body of constitutional common law. Apply-
ing a strict version of the traditional rules for adjudicat-
ing only cases and controversies, one could argue that 
the Supreme Court should not go beyond the specifi c 
facts and legal issues present in Galloway when it de-
cides the case.
Nevertheless, my view is that such a fact-specifi c 
decision would be unfortunate. For three decades, 
lower courts have struggled to understand and apply 
Marsh to the legislative prayer controversies they were 
called upon to adjudicate. These cases, of course, were 
never heard by the Supreme Court.  However, their 
diverse fact patterns raise a number of issues that the 
Court could—and should—address.
The major split among the approximately dozen 
progeny of Marsh involves the issue of whether only 
“nonsectarian” prayer is constitutional. Six courts have 
answered this question in the affi rmative,60 but at least 
two have held that sectarian prayers, at least within 
limits, can be constitutional.61 The reason for this seems 
obvious: the ambiguous, even cryptic, language from 
Marsh noted above.62
The Court observed that while Chaplain Robert E. 
Palmer had earlier given explicitly Christian prayers 
before the Nebraska Legislature, he had removed all 
references to Christ after a 1980 complaint from a Jew-
ish legislator.63 Thus, in context, one could understand 
the Court’s statement to mean that Palmer’s prayers 
were only constitutional because they were nonsectar-
ian, and some courts have held thus.64 
One could also understand the Court to mean that 
so long as the speaker refrained from proselytizing or 
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(including at least one Member of today’s majority) have, in 
separate opinions, repudiated the brain-spun ‘Lemon Test’ that 
embodies the supposed principle of neutrality between religion 
and irreligion.”) See also Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches 
Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398-399 (1993) (Scalia, 
J. concurring in judgment) (collecting criticism of Lemon); 
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692, 693 (2005) (Thomas, J. 
concurring); Board of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. 
v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 720 (1994) (O’Connor, J. concurring 
in part and concurring in judgment); County of Allegheny 
v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655-656, 672-673 (1989) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); Wallace 
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see 
also Committee for Public Ed. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 
444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (disparaging 
“the Sisyphean task of trying to patch together the ‘blurred, 
indistinct, and variable barrier’ described in Lemon”); Roemer 
v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768 (1976) (White, J., 
concurring in judgment) (“I am no more reconciled now to 
Lemon I than I was when it was decided…. The threefold test 
of Lemon I imposes unnecessary, and…superfl uous tests for 
establishing [a First Amendment violation].”)
10. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-223 (1997) (quoting 
Mitchell v. Helms 530 U.S. 793, 794 (2000)). The Supreme
Court recast the “entanglement” prong of the Lemon test
“as simply one criterion relevant to determining a statute’s 
effect.” Thus, the Court in effect confl ated the effects and 
entanglement prongs, turning the three-part Lemon test into a 
two-part test.  The Supreme Court has introduced and applied 
several additional Establishment Clause tests in recent decades. 
Justice O’Connor proposed a modifi ed endorsement test in 
her concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
Justice Kennedy introduced a “coercion test” in Lee v. Weisman, 
505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992). The Court applied a neutrality test in 
Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995); 
see Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, South Carolina, 376 F.3d 292, 
302, n.8 (4th Cir. 2004). Yet another test, the “totality of the 
circumstances” test infl uenced by Justice O’Connor’s approach, 
was applied by the Second Circuit in Galloway, as discussed 
infra.
11. According to the author’s calculation, the Supreme Court 
applied the Lemon test in thirty Establishment Clause cases in 
the twenty years after Lemon v. Kurtzman.
12. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 796 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting).
13. NEBRASKA LEGISLATURE: A HISTORY OF THE UNICAMERAL. http://
nebraskalegislature.gov/about/history_unicameral.php 
(Nebraska is the only state with a unicameral legislature).
14. Chambers v. Marsh, 504 F.Supp. 585, 592 (D.Neb. 1980).
15. Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228, 233 (8th Cir. 1982).
16. Id. at 235. 
17. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1982). 
18. Id. at 788. (“It can hardly be thought that in the same week 
Members of the First Congress voted to appoint and to pay a 
chaplain for each House and also voted to approve the draft of 
the First Amendment for submission to the state, they intended 
the Establishment Clause of the Amendment to forbid what 
they had just declared acceptable”).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 794.
21. See id. at 793. The Court suggested that Chaplain Palmer was 
reappointed because the Legislature was satisfi ed with his 
services and not because of any “preference” given to his 
religious views. 
22. Id. As discussed infra, the question of whether the content of 
legislative prayers should be evaluated by courts has been 
diffi cult to resolve. 
“the strife of sects.”74 The divisiveness is not theoreti-
cal; it is an unfortunate reality. Even without acting 
with such an intention, many Christian prayer givers 
in various parts of the country have delivered prayers 
at city council meetings that appeared to be offi cial. 
Their effect was to affi liate the local government with 
Christianity and to make nonbelievers and adherents 
of nonwestern religions or no religion feel uncomfort-
able and feel like outsiders. Thirty years of divisive-
ness and judicial division are enough; Marsh should be 
overruled.
And yet I am aware that such a decision could 
be regarded as a radical one that could set off a furor 
on the religious right. If total overruling is not pos-
sible, a coherent half measure would be to preserve 
Marsh’s holding for state legislatures and Congress, 
but to overrule it at the municipal level. While such a 
course might seem inconsistent, a persuasive case for 
it is made in the dissent of Judge Donald M. Middle-
brooks in Pelphrey.75 He views Marsh as an “outlier in 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence,”76 and argues that 
the rationale for the Court’s decision based on 1789 his-
tory should not apply to local governments at a time 
when Massachusetts and other states had established 
churches.77 The Court could do worse than reach the 
same conclusion.
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the council’s policy since he intended to close the prayer in the 
name of Jesus Christ); Joyner, supra (“To plant sectarian prayers 
at the heart of local government is a prescription for religious 
discord”), 653 F.3d at 355.
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